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Abstract
The introduction sets out a standard concern that space ethics may be unduly constrain-
ing upon state and private sector activities in space. As a counter-picture, Section 2 sets 
up a distinction between ‘standard space ethics’ and ‘special space ethics’ which will 
allow us to explore ways in which space ethics enables as well as constrains. A case is 
then made in Section 3 for pragmatic constraints upon space ethics itself. Space eth-
ics should be either ‘policy apt’ (able to directly shape space policy within a liberal 
democratic social context) or ‘precursor apt’ (able to contribute productively to broader, 
precursor discussions which may feed into policy apt deliberations).  What makes any 
ethic satisfy either of these conditions will depend upon a range of factors. The ethic 
should have stability (dealt with in Section 3.1). It should not merely track transitory 
voting trends or the ebbs and flows of electoral politics. Secondly, it should have a high 
degree of political realizability (dealt with in Section 3.2). Finally, the ethic should be 
psychologically available. Section 4 then shows the usefulness of these basic constraints 
upon space ethics through a contrast between the emerging US and European agendas in  
astrobiology.
Keywords: astrobiology, ethics, liberal democracy, availability, realizability
1. Introduction
The past decade has seen a considerable shift in the volume and quality of work on space eth-
ics [1–4]. Key standpoints have been articulated more clearly over arguments for and against 
the ‘inherent value’ of microbial life; over the just distribution of limited space resources; over 
the ethical issues of risk (and the distribution of risks and benefits); and over the connection 
between terrestrial environmental ethics and planetary protection elsewhere. Ethical consid-
erations are, however, still sometimes regarded as constraints of an unhelpful, and possibly 
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arbitrary if politically necessary, sort. Unhelpful, because they often tell us what we should 
not do, rather than what we have a duty to do, and arbitrary, because of suspicions that ethics 
in general does not answer to how the world is. Politically necessary, because a strict libertar-
ian approach toward the world seems to fit poorly with a functioning liberal democratic soci-
ety where there are requirements of ‘solidarity’ and some conception of a ‘common good’.
Ethical constraining is, thus, part of any functioning society and, in the case of liberal dem-
ocratic societies, obviously so. It is tempting, however, in some contexts (such as human 
activities in space), to include such constraints only as side considerations, pushed out to the 
margins, and linked perhaps to philosophical or metaphysical commitments of a peculiar 
sort. Here, we might think again about theories of inherent value or about ethics formed as an 
extension of some or other set of religious commitments.
To some extent, this is where ethics is placed in NASA’s Astrobiology Strategy [5], i.e. on 
the margins, securing only 13 lines in a 256 page text. By contrast, at the time of writing, 
Working Group 5 of the COST Action TD1308 is finalizing a White Paper Astrobiology and 
Society in Europe Today (2018) where ethics is situated firmly within the humanities and the 
humanities firmly within astrobiology [6]. Of course, due allowances must be made here for 
NASA’s statutory remit: it may be their business to support constructive reflection upon the 
societal aspects of Astrobiology, but it is not their business to tell us the difference between 
right and wrong. (Although, in fairness, the WG5 document also does not seek to do that.) 
Even so, the marginal positioning of ethics within the NASA document looks like more than 
statutory compliance. It looks like awkwardness and perhaps also caution about the con-
straints that ethics might introduce.
At the same time, NASA has helped to fund work on astrobiology and society (such as the 
recent project with the Princeton Centre for Theological Inquiry, ‘Inquiry on the Societal 
Implications of Astrobiology’ which ran from 2015 to 2017. Within such ‘societal implications’ 
work, ethics is more obviously central. Compliance with international space law (which is 
within NASA’s remit) is also entangled with a range of ethical considerations, as are attempts 
to justify funding on space research. These reach beyond prudential considerations such as 
the generation of commercial spin-offs. My suggestion, then, is not that NASA or any other 
body might be seeking to evade the problems of ethics, but rather that the marginalization 
of ethics within the above document is both understandable and symptomatic. Ethics can 
be difficult to place, and particularly so at present, given the emergence of private sector 
space activity in combination with state-funded programs. It is an important and (given the 
context of liberal democratic societies) reasonable concern that ethical considerations should 
not unduly constrain either scientific exploration or the development of commerce. It is also 
a reasonable assumption that these two must find an accommodation with one another, and 
that ethics should not get in the way of their doing so unless the way in which it is done hap-
pens to be particularly objectionable (e.g. through the strict subordination of science to com-
merce—an unlikely scenario).
And so we have a picture of ethics as troubling and potentially constraining what is prob-
lematic about this picture is that it is a little one-sided. There are important respects in which 
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ethics does constrain, but in the context of space it also enables. Indeed, it has a track record 
of doing so. This will be explored in Section 2 below. However, ethics can only do this if 
it itself is reasonably constrained or ‘fit for purpose,’ although what counts as ‘reasonable’ 
constraint, and what is ‘fit for purpose’ (hence not arbitrary) in relation to human activities 
in space, will need a little cashing out. Section 3 will attempt to make some headway on 
these matters. Overall, the chapter is about the shape that space ethics needs to have if it is 
to be appropriately situated. It is about basic methodology, ‘basic’ in the sense of ‘rudimen-
tary’ rather than ‘foundational.’ There is no presumption that knowledge in this domain has 
a foundational structure. Rather, the chapter specifies requirements that any ethic should 
meet, irrespective of its preference for a terminology of rights, duties, consequences, integ-
rity, or virtue.
The implications of the relevant, rudimentary, methodological considerations will be 
explored in Section 4. As an exemplar, in the light of these considerations, we may be better 
placed to make sense of the differences between the above, emerging, European and NASA 
agendas in astrobiology: as competing players in a zero-sum game (ethical constraint and 
regulation versus their marginalization), or as contributory responses, each playing a useful 
role within a much larger conversation. The primary concern of what follows is, however, 
basic methodology rather than any comprehensive untangling of the differences between 
these agendas.
2. Space ethics as enabling as well as constraining
Space ethics may be broken down into subdivisions in multiple ways. For convenience, the 
subdivisions appealed to here will be ‘standard ethical considerations’ and ‘special ethical 
considerations’ with the latter particularly (although not exclusively) associated with space. 
Issues of safety, risk and its disclosure belong within the standard ethical considerations. 
They apply equally to a broad range of other terrestrial human activities. By contrast, the 
ethics of SETI and at least some considerations of planetary protection (such as the avoid-
ance of forward contamination) involve considerations which are peculiar to space, or at 
least to space together with a relatively small number of special terrestrial contexts. For 
the moment, I will simply assume that planetary protection, e.g. matters such as forward 
contamination, really is entangled with ethics, although this is an assumption which may 
seem more obvious to ethicists than to policy theorists or the developers of protocols. The 
entanglement of SETI with ethics is, by contrast, non-controversial: Do we have a duty to 
search for life? Do we have a responsibility to try to discover intelligent life before we signal 
our own presence? And so on.
My suggestion is not that this broad contrast between standard and special ethical con-
siderations is a rigid dichotomy, but merely that it holds up to a point and is useful for 
present purposes. With regard to both sides of the division, I want to suggest that ethical 
considerations often play an enabling as well as constraining role. Even so, some caution 
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is warranted. Often, is not always. Also, such an enabling role may seem suspiciously for-
tuitous. There is, however, a reason why ethics is often enabling. A large class of ethical 
problems in space involve issues of justice, and justice is readily recognizable as an enabler 
for agents. It entrenches both special entitlements and approximations to various kinds of 
equality of access and opportunity. Of course, not all matters of space ethics involve justice. 
And in those cases whether or not there is an enabling dimension to ethics may involve a 
more mixed story. For example, the more metaphysical arguments about inherent micro-
bial value may offer little in the way of enabling to any agents. Or, if enabling, they may 
merely be so in the sense that they back up actions (e.g. forms of microbial protection) 
which enable science in contexts where we also have more straightforward prudential rea-
sons for the same protective measures.
2.1. Standard space ethics as enabling
The enabling aspects of various standard ethical considerations are easily seen. As a point 
of standard ethics, space exploration should not reproduce familiar forms of gender bias, 
with rank upon rank of white, male (and for public purposes, heterosexual) astronauts 
traveling into space. When, for example, Senator Louie Gohment stood up in the US House 
of Representatives on May 26 2016, and insisted that there will be no gay space colo-
nies, reasonable ethical concerns about gender bias were raised [7]. Nor should the safety 
of humans sent into space, or working on the ground with dangerous rocket fuels, be 
unreasonably compromised or put at risk without appropriate disclosure of these risks. 
Pressures to speed up the frustratingly slow pace of Virgin Galactic’s space tourism pro-
gram should not end up with lives lost and debris on the floor of the Mojave Desert. 
Reasonable precautions ought to be taken to avoid any repetition of their test crash in 
October 2014, and their rocket fuel accident of 2007 in which three people were killed 
on the ground. This is not, of course, a defense of risk aversion. Aviation kills, but so 
does road traffic, in appallingly larger numbers, in tens of thousands across the USA each 
year. Death by road accident in Tel Aviv is consistently higher than death by terrorism 
across the whole of Israel. In the UK, more than a quarter of a million people have died 
on the roads since the 1950s. In each case, the response of introducing constraints has not 
collapsed into a position of preventing movement, but rather has been geared to enable 
safety. Reasonable caution is not, therefore, the same as risk aversion. There are, admit-
tedly, also prudential reasons for such caution in the case of space tourism, i.e. the public-
ity sensitivity of a high investment business. Yet the ethical side of these matters is also 
built in and accepted by Virgin Galactic.
More generally, research ought to be conducted and reported in line with appropriate sets of 
standards and researchers ought to meet the requirements of professional integrity. In both cases, 
these are ethical oughts. As an illustration of the enabling role of standard ethics, these are contexts 
where ethical failures tend to be entangled with missed opportunities and with technical fail-
ures. For example, we know more now about the bodily and psychological effects of prolonged 
stays in space than we would do if the all-male pattern of the Gemini and Apollo programs had 
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been endlessly repeated. Opportunities would otherwise have been missed. This is also a point 
where standard and special considerations meet. To date, no woman has set foot upon the Moon. 
This is an ethical failing of a familiar terrestrial sort. In the UK, for example, at the time of writ-
ing, although there have been 10 elected or acting Labour Prime Ministers and First Ministers of 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland since the 1990s, none have been women. Gender-based 
exclusions at the top are common even with respect to organizations that protest about the very 
same problem. However, the fact that no woman has ever set foot upon the Moon is also a more 
special consideration. It spans the standard/special divide. It is both about commonplace job dis-
crimination (a narrow ethical consideration) and also about the broader ways in which we think of 
space exploration as a human project. (Where humanity is not monopolized by any single gender.)
More tragically, standard ethical failures concerning risk and its disclosure were bound into 
the tragedies of the Columbia Space Shuttle disaster in 2003 and the Challenger disaster of 
1986. The ‘normalization of deviance,’ i.e. the undercritical acceptance of anomaly and under-
performance in one case, and poor risk assessment and disclosure of a known problem with 
the o-rings in the other, will both qualify as ethical failures of a serious sort, on any plausible 
account of the proper concerns of the ethics of risk [8]. Ethical failures and technical failures 
are, in this way, joined. They can be different aspect of the same problems. Ethics of this 
standard sort may then be constraining, even inconvenient, but constraining in ways that 
can sometimes increase the overall likelihood of mission success and of mission participation 
from across groups who might otherwise be unfairly excluded.
Again, a qualification here is that technical problems of the sort mentioned above may also 
be dealt with in ways which are utterly unmotivated by ethics, and focused solely upon mis-
sion success. However, this fits poorly with actual NASA practice and with the behaviours 
of other reputable bodies for whom professional standards are treated routinely as matters of 
good ethical practice. If anything, an unusually high level of attention is given to the safety of 
astronauts by contrast with those involved in other, high risk but lower profile, lines of work 
(construction would be an obvious example, where fatality levels are high).
2.2. Special space ethics as enabling
Will a parallel argument apply also in relation to special ethical considerations in space? There 
are good reasons, related to planetary protection and fair access, to believe so. Planetary pro-
tection enables science. That is the primary goal of the safeguards adopted to avoid forward 
contamination. It is geared to the avoidance of contamination that might corrupt indications 
of life elsewhere, or make their detection unreliable. Yet we may still ask ‘What does this 
have to do with ethics?’ Is such protection genuinely an ethical issue, or merely a prudential 
safeguard for science? Although, here again, it is not obvious that the division between pru-
dential and ethical is a hard distinction. After all, prudential considerations appeal ultimately 
to some sort of good or goods, or some sort of interest or interests. In the present case, this is 
the interests of science and, indirectly, the interest that we have in science as a social good. If 
science were not a social good then a great deal of taxation-based expenditure would face a 
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major justification problem. Indeed, one of the more convincing defenses of space advocacy, 
in the work of James Schwartz, draws upon the value of science as the primary and most effec-
tive justification for human activities in space [9, 10].
How far we take this attitude toward planetary protection as, in some respects an ethical mat-
ter is a further, and difficult, question. The European White Paper, mentioned above, tends 
toward the view that it should be regarded as a form of environmental protection, thereby 
aligning it more closely with the broader range of ethical considerations that we now apply 
in relation to terrestrial sites. What ultimately justifies such terrestrial protection is, of course, 
also a matter of debate: human interests or something broader. Even so, clear extensions of 
terrestrial environmental ethics to space can be made. They include a safeguarding of the 
available range of human wilderness experiences in a solar system where few planets and 
moons are ever likely to be suitable for human habitation. Such an approach can also appeal 
to existing space law. The Outer Space Treaty does, after all, classify space as the ‘common 
heritage of mankind’ [11]. And even the requirement of avoiding forward contamination may 
be read in the light of the requirement that back contamination should also be avoided, a clear 
appeal to risk and the value of something: humans, or perhaps the terrestrial biosphere.
What this means at a practical level is, of course, a matter for debate. One proposed option, 
from Charles Cockell, which draws out the ethical dimensions of planetary protection, is that 
there is a case for something akin to national parks on the Moon and Mars, reserved areas pro-
tected from human use but not necessarily from all human activity [12]. Of course, none of this 
implies that the actual technical measures currently taken under the remit of planetary protec-
tion fall short. It is not to be confused with the claim that NASA and/or COSPAR are ‘getting it 
wrong’ when it comes to the protocols and the nuts and bolts of planetary landings. We are also 
a long way from the kind of presence that would make planetary parks at all feasible (or indeed 
worthwhile). This approach of treating planetary protection as a form of environmental protec-
tion is, as yet, simply about the best justifications and longer term scope of protective measures.
The view of planetary protection from NASA, and COSPAR, has admittedly tended to be 
more modest, with planetary protection regarded in a different light from environmental pro-
tection, as protection of a special sort, albeit with the thought of environmental protection 
sitting somewhere in the background [13]. In some ways, such an approach strengthens the 
separation between standard ethics (which includes environmental protection) and special 
ethics (which is distinctive). But if we soften this distinction, then a broader range of special 
ethical considerations can also be seen to play an enabling role, particularly in relation to 
the safeguarding of science, and of access to limited or scarce resources in space. There are, 
after all, only so many satellite niches [4]; only so many asteroids of the right type for mining 
that come within reasonable reach [14]; only so much 3He, for energy production, in lunar 
and asteroid regolith [15]; only so many strategically valuable ‘peaks of eternal light’ on the 
Moon places where the chances of finding water ice and a continuous solar energy supply 
are unusually high [16]. There is only one Moon and one Mars. Our prospects of ever moving 
beyond the Solar System are unclear, and within the latter, there are serious difficulties in the 
face of establishing a stable presence on more than a few surface locations. Venus is too hot 
and the gas giants have extremely deep gravity wells, only their moons may be suitable.
Into Space - A Journey of How Humans Adapt and Live in Microgravity22
Given this, even if we hold that humans are all that ultimately matters, it will still be an ethical 
priority to safeguard resources and opportunities in ways that involve constraint. Otherwise, 
conditions of justice will not be realized within and between generations. With regard to future 
generations of humans, through such constraining of our actions other humans will be enabled. 
And, with respect to projects that are multi-generational (which surely includes certain aspects 
of the development of a human presence in space) and require opportunities to be available to 
future humans as well as ourselves, there will also be enabling as well as constraint.
With regard to the current generation, asteroid mining in particular poses issues of claims 
and entitlements. Identification of good candidate asteroids for mining and the setting up 
infrastructure will be major investments. It will be important to private sector players, and for 
the investment process, that their entitlements (however judged) are secured. The very last 
thing that an emerging asteroid mining industry needs is exposure to the risks of some form 
of claim jumping or free riding, where the benefits of preliminary investment by one company 
are reaped by others. Considerations of justice again enter into such matters. These will, of 
course, be areas for future space law, but guided by considerations of policy, legal principles 
and standards of equity and fairness, which involve an ethical dimension. Ethics can play an 
enabling role (or more precisely, a dual constraining and enabling role) for stable forms of 
commercial space activity.
3. Constraining ethics
As a reinforcer of the point that space ethics can work in this way, and will ordinarily tend 
do so when matters of justice are involved, there is a case for saying that ethics in general is 
ordinarily constrained so that the ways in which it limits action are themselves limited.
This is not, however, a case of arbitrarily rigging ethical deliberation in ‘subjective’ ways so 
that whatever projects we happen to prefer are then licensed. Rather, the social dimension of 
ethics draws it away from anything of this sort and calls instead upon an answer to the ques-
tion: ‘What is an ethic for?’ And here, the issue is ‘an answer’ rather than ‘the answer.’ There 
are, after all, multiple kinds of ethics and it is far from clear that they all play exactly the same 
functional roles. The ethics of personal friendship is very different from the ethics of technol-
ogy (even if there are areas of overlap). In the context of space, what we are dealing with is 
also a social ethic and not just an individual one. This means that we are in the territory of the 
kind of ethics that can feed into policy and legislation, rather than an ethic geared to the duties 
of love and friendship or to balance out the human need for solitude with the dangers of lone-
liness. I will also take it, as a background assumption already hinted at above, that the kind 
of social ethics we ought to be interested in presupposes something like liberal democracy. 
More strictly, it presupposes political organization that preserves the good features of the lat-
ter although, at present, the only political organization known to do so is liberal democracy.
In line with this, we can begin to set up a series of adequacy conditions that any plausible 
approach toward ethics in space should satisfy. This will not be guaranteed to yield a single 
outcome, a single correct ethical theory, with only one approach satisfying the conditions. 
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Rather, it is more likely to narrow down the field of plausible candidates. As a first pass, I 
will suggest that any such candidate ethic should satisfy at least one of the following two 
conditions:
1. It should be ‘policy apt’ in the sense of being able to directly shape space policy within a 
liberal democratic social context.
2. It should be ‘precursor apt’ in the sense of being able to contribute productively to broader, 
precursor, discussions which may then feed into ‘policy apt’ deliberations.
The second condition is less constraining than the first, and is geared toward some form 
of multiculturalism and the inclusion of religious perspectives and varying metaphysical 
perspectives within discussions. This will not violate any church/state division, or what 
liberals refer to as ‘state neutrality over conceptions of the Good.’ It will not require the 
privileging of one philosophical metaphysic over another because it is only at a precursor 
level. Although, in practice, the imperfections and pragmatism of liberal democracy as well 
as the periodic emergence of a broad consensus, will mean that the two sorts of discussions 
are likely to remain distinct only up to a point. Key religious commitments might, for exam-
ple, turn out to have practical implications which are identical to those of the best secular 
discourses and may then be captured in a more neutral language that is also more ‘policy 
apt’ and does not give the impression that state policy is an endorsement of a particular 
denomination.
The point applies also to metaphysical disputes. (By which I mean disputes about moral 
ontology, the nature of truth in the domain of the moral, and disputes about what it is that 
ethical claims ultimately attempt to track.) Within this class of concerns, we may include 
disputes and theories about ‘inherent value’. Disputes that might well run deep but still con-
verge upon similar practical outcomes. This has been the case in the European discussions. 
Cockell [17, 18] and Milligan [3] have tended to be sympathetic toward extending notions of 
inherent value to microbial life; Persson [19] has tended to link such value more exclusively 
to sentience. Smith [20], a contributor form the US side, has considered structured complex-
ity as a rival to sentience. Yet these positions converge over regarding microbial protection as 
an ethical requirement and, hence, planetary protection as, properly, a form of environmen-
tal protection. Strong pragmatists would no doubt say that ‘there is no difference that makes 
no difference’, and because of agreement about ways of proceeding, that these metaphysical 
disputes are empty. The claim here is a rather different one. It allows room for such disputes 
to be substantial and bring matters of importance to light, albeit at a precursor level. In fact, 
the presence of multiple ways of reaching similar practical conclusions will be a positive 
virtue from the standpoint of consensus building.
An upshot of the above is that the distinction between policy-apt discussions and pre-
cursor-apt discussions ensures that a place can be found for religious and metaphysical 
deliberation, but it does not try to run policy considerations directly from the latter. In this 
respect, it tackles a problem that has repeatedly emerged in other forms of ethical discus-
sion about the non-human (e.g. within animal rights discussions and ecology) where the 
connection between metaphysical and practical has often been overly direct. Human moral 
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psychology and any sense of political constraints have sometimes been set aside in favor of 
claims based upon special theories of inherent value. In other words, what is again being 
upheld here is a broadly liberal democratic standpoint and pragmatism about space ethics.
What makes any ethic satisfy one of the above conditions of policy aptness or precursor apt-
ness will itself be a complex matter. However, the following three features can be set out.
3.1. Stability
While an ethic may be adapted to liberal democracy, it should not track the ebbs and flows of 
electoral fortunes, at least not in a close way. Any standpoint in space ethics, especially with 
regard to its special features (and the way that they often involve large questions about human-
ity) will be subverted by a preoccupation with 5 year terms of office. Developing a human 
presence in space is a multi-generational project and should be recognized as such. This is, of 
course, a familiar difficulty. Robert Zubrin (although I do not sympathize with his particular 
approach toward Mars settlement) has made the point repeatedly and well [21]. One of the 
main problems about getting a workable and ambitious US space program for a Mars landing 
is the fact that the government keeps on changing. Getting humans to Mars is a project that is 
likely to require at least two decades (the launch windows alone are a significant limitation). 
During that time, multiple changes of political priorities, personnel and party ascendancy, may 
occur. This may seem like, but is not, directed against the party that is currently ascendant. A 
space ethic that deliberately tracked President Obama’s social attitudes, without special rea-
sons to believe that the latter would endure, would have been as counterproductive as one 
which tracks President Trump’s social attitudes. A viable space ethic has to accept the political 
constraints of a working liberal democracy, but must have greater stability than voting trends.
3.2. Political realizability
Even given its stability, a sense of realpolitik should incline us to reject a belief which is famil-
iar within various protest movements, such as sections of environmentalism and the animal 
rights movement (movements with which I happen to sympathize): the belief that the great 
considerations of humanity’s future, or the Earth’s future, or the future of sentient life forms 
are capable of trumping political divisions because of their importance and moral depth. The 
latter do not license some kind of exceptional politics, set apart from our flawed democratic 
processes. Even given the assumption that global warming does threaten to be a disaster 
for humanity and for other creatures, this alone does not imply that there is a way to work 
around the party systems and regular divisions of liberal democracy, rather than working 
through them in the search for some stable form of consensus building or bipartisan co-oper-
ation. Similarly, the horrors of animal harm within the food chain may be every bit as terrible 
as suggested on the strongest animal rights critique, but the exceptional nature of the harms 
does not make an exceptional politics any more viable. Such causes will succeed within the 
bounds of what is politically realizable under liberal democracy, or else they will not succeed. 
This is a completely general, and pragmatic, consideration and applies as readily to space eth-
ics as it does to ethics of other sorts. The fact that we are talking about humanity’s future does 
not imply that we can set aside the regular constraints of politics.
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3.3. Psychological availability
Finally, an ethic should not be so idiosyncratic or metaphysically laden that its practical impli-
cations could only be accepted by a small number of humans at any given time. Such an ethic 
would not only fail to meet the requirement of policy aptness, it would also fail to meet the 
requirements of precursor aptness because no one outside of the limited group could come to 
share the same vision of what is to be done. On its own, however, this constraint would only 
provide a minimal account of psychological availability. I will suggest a stronger version that 
involves two additional constraints although, under analysis, these may turn out to be aspects 
of a single consideration.
Firstly, the ethic should be of a sort that psychologically normal humans could live by as 
opposed to merely defending in public fora. I will take it that this will rule out any form of 
strict consequentialism, or any ethic that is built around the overriding importance of a single 
consideration even if that consideration happens to be an extension of humanity’s survival. 
We are, naturally, pluralists about ethical norms and one of the strongest and best features 
of liberal democracy is that it draws this out: many things matter to us. So, for example, an 
overriding preoccupation with the manifest destiny of humanity should not lead us to regard 
tragic accidents as merely technical setbacks in a greater cause rather than regarding them as 
occasions for reflection upon issues of safety, responsibility and harm. In extremis, and contra 
Werner Von Braun, a single-minded ethical commitment to a human future in space cannot 
override the ethical issues of whether or not the labor force used in a space program is free 
or forced, protected by adequate safety measures or exposed to excessive risk, punishments 
and harms. The ethic should not be monomaniacal or otherwise fanatical. Neither of these is 
a good fit for liberal democracy.
Secondly, and perhaps more controversially, the ethic should be of a sort that does not conceal 
our real motivations behind forms of public justification. It should allow us to be honest about 
what actually drives our attitudes. For example, if we tend to support environmental protec-
tion because of a sense of the value of places in their own right, then we should not have to 
pretend that the real reasons for environmental protection always turn out to be a concern for 
humans. Public justifications and real motivations may never fully align, we are too dissonant 
for that, but they should not be forced apart in ways that make them radically distinct and 
lead to concealment. Our ethical theory for space should not force us into what has been called 
‘moral schizophrenia’ where the real motivations are hidden [22]. The policy-apt/precursor-
discussion apt distinction may be understood as geared toward this consideration, with the 
latter retaining ample opportunities to set out what it is that really motivates our concern.
4. Implications for ethical agendas in astrobiology
Given these adequacy conditions, how then do the contrasting NASA and WG5 astrobiology 
agendas fare? I will take it that both meet all three requirements, but doing so is not exactly a 
binary matter. One approach may meet any one of these conditions more strongly or more effec-
tively than another. Neither the NASA approach nor the WG5 approach obviously wins out 
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across the board. In terms of political realizability, the middling-constraint approach of NASA 
has the clear advantage of actually being linked to a robust program of activities in space. It has 
not only realizability but demonstrated realizability. More generally, given a certain degree of 
reluctance on the part of liberal democratic states to strongly constrain the actions of private 
agents, unless activities in space pose some clear and immediate threat to human interests, this is 
always likely to be an area where a more modest set of restrictions scores high.
By contrast, the WG5 approach is likely to score more strongly on both stability and, perhaps 
surprisingly, psychological availability. Indeed, there is a case for saying that if it scores 
higher on one, it is also likely to score higher on the other. In terms of stability, there are long-
term socio-economic pressures in the USA toward a more robust inclusion of ethical consid-
erations in policy formation. Ethical considerations have tended to spread through public 
sphere activity, and have also tended to spill beyond concern for the human alone. Other pres-
sures are more bound up with the peculiar conditions of space. Firstly, middling regulation 
is all well and good for the USA while it is the dominant player. As that ceases to be true, or 
becomes heavily qualified, the pressures to secure position through regulation (through infor-
mal norms or international agreements) will tend to increase. Given the growing recognition 
that key, accessible, space resources (water, 3He, orbital niches, accessible metallic asteroids) 
are scarce or at least limited, the commercial and scientific pressures toward regulation to 
ensure continuity/sustainability of access will increase over the course of time. Astrobiological 
research will then fit into a broader environment where issues of just distribution of opportu-
nities and access claims are normal.
Secondly, there is an interesting and much-commented upon feature of domestic politics in 
the USA. At least notionally, protestant evangelism has political influence upon Republican 
politics and this denomination records an unusually high level of skepticism about the search 
for, and likelihood of finding, life elsewhere. This is partly because of a perceived connec-
tion with evolutionary theory. However, this skepticism need not imply that a crisis of faith 
would result from the discovery of life. Its presence varies enormously depending upon the 
pattern of local pastoral care, and it sits side by side with the emergence of a more robust envi-
ronmental ethical commitment within the same denomination (on something close to classic 
Christian ‘stewardship’ grounds). If issues of planetary protection were reframed as matters 
of the latter sort, i.e. as matters of environmental protection, this would carry some obvious 
advantages in terms of winning over sympathies for a protection agenda. An ethical agenda 
based upon a strong conception of environmental duties (inclusive of a form of respect for 
life, and perhaps also for the integrity of places) might turn out to have greater stability than 
one based upon a lack of space-frontier constraint.
Finally, in terms of psychological availability, the WG5 approach may be slightly better 
placed to accommodate the fact that we do not (perhaps cannot) simply concern ourselves 
with human interests. Whatever our theories, what we actually value always tends to spill over 
these bounds. This does not, of course, require us to commit to peculiar doctrines, e.g. the quite 
different metaphysical claim that microbial life has equal value with human life, or with sentient 
life, or anything of that sort. Value egalitarianism would not itself be psychologically available 
in the relevant sense. It would be unlivable. Its practical implications would not then be either 
policy apt or precursor apt. Whether we speak about inherent value or about human practices of 
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valuing, our natural pluralism should not be confused with an inability to recognize that we 
often have more reasons for protecting and valuing one thing rather than another. For many 
practical purposes, talk about ‘inherent value’ will translate into ‘reasons for action,’ and these 
can vary significantly from object to object in ways that can be difficult to connect to any such 
version of value egalitarianism. Nonetheless, we do value places, things and other creatures in 
ways that are more in line with thinking of planetary protection as a variety of environmental 
protection. The latter is a more readily available attitude than a stricter attempt to limit concern 
to the human, even if doing so currently remains close to a statutory requirement for NASA.
What this mixed picture also suggests is that the model of the ‘one correct approach’ toward 
space ethics within astrobiology will be a poor fit. Rather, even where two differing agendas 
both meet the basic adequacy conditions set out above, they are still likely to fare better by 
some criteria and less well by others. Given this, the appropriate model for ethical delibera-
tion, within which we can situate the WG5 approach and the NASA Astrobiology Roadmap, 
is best thought of as a dialog rather than a zero-sum game. There is, of course, a great deal 
more to say about this dialog, and these particular contributions to it. Even so, the little that 
has been said illustrates the practical guiding role of the basic constraints set out above.
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